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Abstract 
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A long established distinction exists in developmental psychology between young children’s ability to 
judge whether objects are seen by another, known as “level-1” perspective-taking, and judging how the other 
sees those objects, known as “level-2” perspective-taking (Flavell et al., 1981).  Samson et al. (2010) provided 
evidence that there are two routes available to adults for level-1 perspective-taking: one which is triggered 
relatively automatically and the other requiring cognitive control.  We tested whether both these routes were 
available for adults’ level-2 perspective-taking.  Explicit judgements of both level-1 and level-2 perspectives 
were subject to egocentric interference, suggesting a need for cognitive control.  Evidence of unintentional 
perspective-taking was limited to level-1 judgements.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In order to predict and explain the behaviour of others in even simple social environments it is often 
necessary to take into account their perspective on the world.  People’s actions are dictated by their goals and 
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intentions, which in turn are dictated by beliefs and desires, any of which may diverge from our own.  
Cooperating and competing with others regularly requires representation of these perspectives.  One case where 
such situations arise is in taking visual perspectives.  Developmental psychologists have argued that perspective-
taking is fundamentally different at two levels (Flavell et al., 1981).  Young children successfully understand 
whether someone sees something or not (a level-1 perspective) before they understand how something looks to 
them (a level-2 perspective).  In the current paper we test whether the cognitive characteristics of adults’ 
perspective-taking are similarly divergent and discuss the implications for how we understand the impressive 
performance of infants on some perspective-taking and theory of mind tasks (Luo & Baillargeon, 2007; Onishi 
& Baillergeon, 2005). 
 The traditional method for testing perspective-taking involves using direct measures.  Participants 
(often children) are asked to assess the perspectives of others and either report this perspective or make 
judgements about what a character will do given that they hold a specific perspective.  For example, Piaget and 
Inhelder (1956) asked children to report how an array of three mountains would appear to an experimenter and 
Masangkay et al. (1974) asked children to judge whether someone sat opposite them would see a picture of a 
turtle as being the right way up, or upside down.  Although tasks vary in difficulty, these direct measures all 
suggest that perspective-taking is relatively taxing for young children.  Interestingly, children’s errors are 
“egocentric”, reflecting over-application of their own perspective (Flavell et al, 1981; Piaget & Inhelder, 1956).  
Overcoming this egocentrism is thought to be crucial in the development of perspective-taking (Piaget & 
Inhelder, 1956) and continues to be taxing, even for adults (Epley et al., 2004; Keysar et al, 2003; Kessler & 
Thomson, 2010; Michelon & Zacks, 2005; Nickerson, 1999).  Taken together, these findings support a view of 
perspective-taking as an effortful process. 
 Recent research in infant (Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005; Sodian, Theormer & Metz, 2007; Southgate, 
Senju & Csibra, 2007) and comparative (Clayton & Emery, 2007; Hare, Call &Tomasello, 2001, Santos, Nissan 
& Feruggia, 2006) psychology has suggested that, under certain circumstances, perspective-taking might not be 
so difficult after all.  Indirect measures, monitoring eye gaze and other spontaneous behaviours, seem to show 
that infants and non-human animals with rather limited cognitive resources can track perspectives.  One 
interpretation of such results is that researchers have finally been able to find measures sensitive enough to show 
how easy perspective-taking really is (Baillargeon, Scott & He, 2010; Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005).  Others are 
more sceptical about whether such evidence counts as genuine perspective-taking or “theory of mind” (Heyes, 
2014, in press; Perner & Ruffman, 2005; Ruffman & Perner, 2005; Ruffman, Taumoepeau & Perkins, 2012).  In 
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contrast to these polarised positions, it will be our working hypothesis that direct measures and indirect 
measures of perspective-taking can both reveal interesting features about the cognitive profile of perspective-
taking. 
Samson et al. (2010) identified both a direct and an indirect measure of perspective-taking using a 
single paradigm, requiring adults to judge the number of dots that could be seen on the walls of a room (a level-
1 perspective-taking task).  On separate trials, adults took either their own perspective (Self trials) or that of a 
cartoon avatar present in the room (Other trials).  On Other trials (a direct measure of perspective-taking), 
participants were slower and more error-prone at judging the avatar’s perspective when their own perspective 
was different, demonstrating egocentric interference.  Importantly, an analogous effect was also observed on 
Self trials, when participants were also slower and more error prone at judging their own perspective when the 
irrelevant perspective of the avatar happened to be different from their own (which they dubbed altercentric 
interference).  This novel observation suggested that participants calculated the avatar’s perspective, even 
though they had no reason to do so, leading to “altercentric” interference on judgements of their own 
perspective (see Kovacs et al. 2010 for a related phenomenon).  The authors suggested that this altercentric 
interference provided an indirect measure of the operation of a process of visual perspective-taking that had 
been triggered relatively automatically. 
Researchers in the cognitive sciences have long argued over the most appropriate definition of 
automaticity.  Bargh (1994) described the automaticity of a processes as the degree to which it displays four 
features: Operation outside of cognitive control, efficiency, lack of awareness and lack of intentionality.  For our 
purposes, it is clear that the automaticity of perspective-taking is potentially interesting in the degree to which it 
is efficient and can operate without cognitive control, as both of these factors may make such a process available 
to infants and non-human animals with limited cognitive resources.    There is evidence to suggest that level-1 
perspectives may be processed both outside of cognitive control, and efficiently.  Samson et al. (2010; see also 
Santiesteban, Catmur, Coughlan Hopkins, Bird, & Heyes, 2014) showed that the altercentric intrusions occurred 
when participants repeatedly judged their own perspective across a same block or even across the entire 
experiment, suggesting that they could not voluntarily ignore the irrelevant perspective of the avatar.  Qureshi 
and colleagues found that adults computed perspectives when they did not need to, even when also completing a 
secondary task that loaded executive function (Qureshi et al, 2010).  To just this extent we conclude that level-1 
perspectives may be calculated in a relatively automatic manner, and that the consequences of this may be 
observed on indirect measures, such as interference from an avatar’s irrelevant perspective when judging one’s 
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own “Self” perspective.  This perspective calculation is not enough to drive explicit perspective judgements, for 
which effortful selection is required especially when “Self” and “Other” perspectives diverge.  
Our key concern in the current work is whether Samson et al’s (2010) altercentric effect would also be 
present for level-2 perspectives.  There are two reasons to hypothesise that level-2 perspectives will not be 
calculated automatically.  Firstly, if the abilities demonstrated on indirect measures reflect cognitively efficient 
processes, then there are strong theoretical reasons for supposing that this efficiency will come at the cost of 
inflexibility about the kinds of perspectives that can be processed (Apperly & Butterfill, 2009; Apperly, 2010; 
Butterfill & Apperly, 2013). Recent evidence testing predictions from this account has suggested that children’s 
and adults’ predictive gaze (an “indirect measure”) anticipates the behaviour of an agent with a false belief 
about an object’s location, but no such effect was seen when the agent’s behaviour is based upon a false belief 
about the object’s identity (Low & Watts, 2013). A related prediction is that level-2 perspectives will not be 
processed automatically. Secondly, there are good empirical reasons for supposing that some kinds of 
perspective-taking are significantly more demanding than others.  As well as traditional findings from direct 
measures of visual perspective-taking showing that children pass level-1 tasks around the age of 2-years (Moll 
&Tomasello, 2006), but do not pass similar level-2 tasks till around the age of 4 or 5 (Flavell et al, 1981, 
Masangkay et al., 1974), the level-1/level-2 distinction also captures current limits on evidence of precocious 
abilities shown by infants and non-human animals (Apperly & Butterfill, 2009; Clayton & Emery, 2007; Hare, 
Call & Tomasello, 2006; Song & Baillargeon, 2008).  Many of these new tasks either test or imply level-1 
perspective-taking, but as yet there is no positive evidence of the equivalent level-2 ability.  
 Surtees, Butterfill & Apperly (2012) adapted Samson et al.’s perspective-taking ability to allow for 
level-2 judgments.  In this study, children and adults were asked to make self and other judgments about the 
appearance of a numeral, making use of the fact that some numbers (6 and 9 for example) look different if 
viewed upside down, whilst others (e.g. 0 and 8) look the same.  Across trials there was variation in the type of 
number used and whether the participant and the avatar looked at them from the same angle.  When participants 
made judgements about what number the avatar saw, they found this most difficult in cases where their 
perspective was different from that of the avatar.  Analogous to Samson et al.’s (2010) egocentrism effect, it was 
hardest to judge that the avatar saw a 6 when the participant saw a 9.  However, no “altercentric” effect was 
found for level-2 judgements, as observed from the fact that there was not a specific difficulty for participants in 
judging that they saw a 6 when the avatar saw a 9.  It was concluded from this that level-2 perspective-taking 
was not automatic: There was no evidence of efficiency, nor of operation outside of cognitive control.  There 
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were, however, two clear limitations to Surtees et al.’s findings.  Firstly, there was no direct comparison 
between level-1 and level-2 perspective-taking.  Secondly, to be appropriate for children, participants did 
relatively few trials (only 60), thus limiting power to detect signs of automaticity.  
 To examine the processes involved in adults’ visual perspective-taking, we therefore adapted Samson 
et al.’s and Surtees et al.’s tasks so that we could elicit level-2 as well as level-1 judgements using very similar 
stimuli.  We tested two aspects of automaticity, both whether adults could calculate the avatar’s perspective 
rapidly enough to interfere with their given task and whether they would do so outside of cognitive control.  To 
this end, we varied whether participants completed trials in separate blocks of self and other perspective or 
mixed blocks.  Separate blocks provide more opportunity to strategically ignore the other perspective, thus 
providing a test of whether perspective-taking would operate outside of intentionality and cognitive control.  
Mixed blocks provide less opportunity to strategically ignore the other perspective, thus giving the greatest 
opportunity to observe whether rapid calculation would ever occur.  On trials requiring explicit judgements of 
the “other’s” perspective we follow Samson et al. (2010) and Surtees et al (2012) in predicting evidence of 
egocentrism.  We expected participants to calculate their own perspective relatively automatically and to suffer 
a cost of ignoring this.  On trials requiring explicit judgements of “self” perspective, we predicted altercentric 
effects (interference from the avatar’s perspective) on both of our level-1 conditions, since Samson et al. (2010) 
showed participants to be influenced by the avatar’s level-1 perspective, regardless of opportunities for 
cognitive control.  In contrast, we predicted that altercentric interference from the avatar’s level-2 perspective 
would depend on the level of strategic control available to participants.  We expected no evidence of 
interference in the separate block condition, in which participants have more opportunity for strategically 
processing just their own perspective.  Our mixed block condition, provided the opportunity for the first 
systematic assessment of whether level-2 perspective could be calculated rapidly enough to yield altercentric 
interference under the right conditions.  
 
EXPERIMENT 1 
Method 
Adult participants judged their own perspective or that of a cartoon avatar in a picture stimulus.  Level-
1 judgements involved judging how many balloons could be seen, whilst level-2 involved identifying a numeral 
from its appearance (see figure 1).  Consistency between Self and Other perspectives was varied.  An effect of 
Consistency on Other trials would be evidence of egocentrism, an extra cost due to ignoring one’s own 
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perspective.  An effect of Consistency on Self trials would be evidence of altercentrism, an extra cost due to 
having to ignore the avatar’s perspective, which has been processed unnecessarily.  
 
Participants 
Participants were 64 undergraduate students from the University catholique de Louvain, Belgium 
(Mean age: 19.4; 54 female).  All participated in exchange of course credit or a small honorarium.  
 
Stimuli 
All picture stimuli showed a cartoon avatar next to a table in a room (Figure 1). For level-1 stimuli one 
to three balloons were placed either in front of or behind the avatar.  For Consistent stimuli all of the balloons 
were found in front of the avatar.  For Inconsistent stimuli one or more were behind him.  Samson et al. (2010) 
showed that varying the position of objects in this way did not disrupt processing of self perspective except in 
the presence of an avatar.  For level-2 stimuli a numeral (either a 6 or a 9) was placed on the table.  The numeral 
was seen either laid flat or stood upright.  This crucial design feature of the stimuli meant that if a stimulus 
contained an upright numeral, perspectives were consistent and if the stimulus contained a flat-lying numeral, 
perspectives were inconsistent.  The novelty of these stimuli, compared with those for the level-1 task meant 
that we conducted a pre-test to establish that the orientation of the number did not affect judgements of Self 
perspective in the absence of an avatar (see figure  2). 
 
 
Figure 1, Example of stimuli used. For level-1 perspective-taking, perspectives are inconsistent when 1 or more 
balloons are unseen by the avatar. For level-2 perspective-taking, perspectives are inconsistent when the 
numeral lies flat on the table. Here the avatar sees the numeral in a different orientation. 
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Figure 2. Information on a pre-test performed to test for variation in performance based on the nature of level-2 
stimuli. 
 
Procedure 
Participants were evenly split into four groups: Level-1 Blocked, Level-1 Mixed, Level-2 Blocked and 
Level-2 Mixed, and presented with 208 trials in the Level-1 conditions or 192 trials in the Level-2 conditions.  
The greater number for Level-1 reflects the fact that the Level-1 conditions contained 16 filler trials, included in 
order to make each probe as likely to be combined with a “yes” response (see Samson et al., 2010, for details).  
On each trial (see figure 3) participants saw a fixation cross, followed by a cue as to whose perspective to take.  
Following this a number was presented, for Level-1 perspective-taking, zero, one, two or three; for level-2 
perspective-taking, six or nine.  Finally, participants saw the picture stimulus.  On half of trials, the cues 
matched the content of the picture stimulus, on the other half they did not. Participants responded on a keyboard 
as to whether the cues matched the picture. 
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Figure 3. Example event sequence. Participants were cued with the relevant perspective, either you or him 
(“vous” or “lui” in French). This was followed by the number to verify, for level-1 perspective-taking either 
zero, one, two or three (“zéro", “un”, “deux” or “trois”), for level-2 perspective-taking either six or nine (“six” 
or “neuf”). Participants responded as to the validity of the cue. In the example above, the cues correctly match 
the picture. 
 
Results and Discussion 
Only responses in which the cues and the picture matched were analysed. Two participants who failed 
to perform above chance were excluded.  Outliers were excluded from the analysis of Response Times on the 
basis of being 2.5 standard deviations away from the mean response time (between 2.3% and 2.9% of data 
across the four groups), as were incorrect responses.  For both Response Times and errors, we completed a 
2x2x2 repeated measures ANOVA with Level of perspective-taking (Level-1, Level-2) and Blocking (Mixed, 
Blocked) as between subjects factors and Consistency as a within-subjects factor.  
For Self perspective-taking, our crucial hypothesis of the altercentric effect being limited to level-1 
perspective-taking rests on the interaction between Level, Blocking and Consistency.  For level-1 perspective-
taking, we predicted an effect of Consistency that is apparent irrespective of whether the trials were presented in 
mixed blocks, suggesting that level-1 other perspective taking is triggered by the mere presentation of the avatar 
(Samson et al., 2010).  If level-2 perspective-taking is as rapid and unintentional as level-1 perspective taking, 
then we should find a consistency effect both in the separate and mixed block design.  However, if level-2 
perspective taking is not operating outside of cognitive control, we predict no effect in the separate block design.  
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For the mixed block design, a Consistency effect would demonstrate that people could take the avatar’s effect 
rapidly.  For Other perspective-taking, we predicted that the effect of Consistency would be present across all 
conditions.  It has been regularly found that even adults suffer a cost to evaluating another person’s discrepant 
perspective (Keysar et al., 2003), regardless of whether this is a relatively simple level-1 judgement (Samson et 
al., 2010), or a more complicated level-2 judgement (Surtees et al., 2012).  
 
Self perspective judgements (altercentrism) 
Response Times. We identified a main effect of Consistency (see figure 4),  F(1, 60) = 22.45, p < .001, 
ηp2 = .272; Consistent < Inconsistent, of Level, F(1, 60) = 25.16, p < .001, ηp2 = .295; Level-1 < Level-2, and 
of Blocking, F(1, 60) = 10.19, p = .002, ηp2 = .145. The interaction between Consistency and Blocking was 
significant, F(1, 60) = 7.18, p = .009, ηp2 = .107, as was that between Consistency and Level, F(1, 60) = 6.01, p 
= .017, ηp2 = .091, and there was a trend for an interaction between Consistency, Level and Blocking, F(1, 60) = 
3.37, p = .073, ηp2 = .053.  Since one of our predictions concerned this three-way interaction we investigated 
this trend further. 
 For Level-1 perspective-taking, there was a main effect of Consistency, F(1, 30) = 9.47, p = .004, ηp2 
= .24, Consistent < Inconsistent, a main effect of Blocking F(1, 30) = 6.06, p = .02, ηp2 = .168, Blocked < 
Mixed, but no interaction between Blocking and Consistency, F(1, 30) = 1.33, p = .258, ηp2 = .042. 
For Level-2 perspective-taking, there was a main effect of Consistency, F(1, 30) = 14.99, p = .001, ηp2 
= .16, Consistent < Inconsistent, a main effect of Blocking F(1, 30) = 4.60, p = .04, ηp2 = .133, Blocked < 
Mixed, and an  interaction between Blocking and Consistency, F(1, 30) = 5.83, p = .022, ηp2 = .164. This 
interaction demonstrated that the effect of Consistency was significant for mixed blocks of level-2 perspective-
taking, t(15) = 3.58, p = .003, Consistent < Inconsistent, but not for separate blocks, t(15) = 1.52, p = .150. 
  
Errors. Overall the error rate was very low (4.5%). There was a main effect of Consistency on error 
rate, F(1, 60) = 7.35, p = .009, ηp2 = .109; Consistent < Inconsistent, no effect of Level, F(1, 60) = .296, p = 
.589, ηp2 = .005, and no effect of Blocking, F(1, 60) = 1.06, p = .307, ηp2 = .017. The only significant 
interaction was between Consistency, Blocking and Level, F(1, 60) = 9.37, p = .003, ηp2 = .135.  
For Level-1 perspective-taking, there was a main effect of Consistency, F(1, 30) = 4.30, p = .047, ηp2 = 
.125, Consistent < Inconsistent, no main effect of Blocking F(1, 30) = 2.24, p = .145, ηp2 = .069, and no 
interaction between Blocking and Consistency, F(1, 30) = 2.20, p = .149, ηp2 = .068. 
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For Level-2 perspective-taking, there was a trend for an effect of Consistency, F(1, 30) = 3.40, p = 
.075, ηp2 = .102, Consistent < Inconsistent, no main effect of Blocking F(1, 30) = .10, p = .75, ηp2 = .003, 
Blocked < Mixed, and an  interaction between Blocking and Consistency, F(1, 30) = 7.34, p = .011, ηp2 = .197. 
This interaction demonstrated that the effect of Consistency was significant for mixed blocks of level-2 
perspective-taking, t(15) = 3.78, p = .002, Consistent < Inconsistent, but not for separate blocks, t(15) = .542, p 
= .596. 
 
Other perspective judgements (egocentrism) 
Response Times. We identified a main effect of Consistency, F(1, 60) = 66.80, p < .001, ηp2 = .527; 
Consistent < Inconsistent, of Level, F(1, 60) = 44.27, p < .001, ηp2 = .425; Level-1 < Level-2, and a trend for an 
effect of Blocking, F(1, 60) = 3.617, p = .062, ηp2 = .007. There was a two-way interaction between 
Consistency and Blocking , F(1, 60) = 12.011, p = .001, ηp2 = .167, and a three-way interaction between 
Consistency, Level and Blocking, F(1, 60) = 4.58, p = .036, ηp2 = .071. The interaction between Consistency 
and Level was not significant, F(1, 60) = 1.14, p = .29, ηp2 = .019.   
For Level-1 perspective-taking, there was a main effect of Consistency, F(1, 30) = 138.94, p < .001, 
ηp2 = .822, Consistent < Inconsistent, no main effect of Blocking F(1, 30) = 1.188, p = .284, ηp2 = .038, and an 
interaction between Blocking and Consistency, F(1, 30) = 4.842, p = .036, ηp2 = .139. Though the Consistency 
effect varied in magnitude, it was significant for both blocked t(15) = 6.69, p < .001, and mixed blocked, t(15) = 
10.06, p < .001, conditions.  
For Level-2 perspective-taking, there was a main effect of Consistency, F(1, 30) = 138.94, p < .001, 
ηp2 = .822, Consistent < Inconsistent, no main effect of Blocking F(1, 30) = 2.43, p = .130, ηp2 = .075, Blocked 
< Mixed, and an interaction between Blocking and Consistency, F(1, 30) = 8.64, p = .006, ηp2 = .224. Though 
the Consistency effect varied in magnitude, it was significant for both blocked t(15) = 2.68, p = .017, and mixed 
blocked, t(15) = 4.16, p < .001, conditions. 
 
Errors. Again, error rates were quite low (3.9%). A main effect of Consistency, F(1, 60) = 40.58, p < 
.001, ηp2 = .403; Consistent < Inconsistent, and of Level, F(1, 60) = 7.17, p = .001, ηp2 = .107; Level-1 < Level-
2, but no effect of Blocking, F(1, 60) = .304, p = .584, ηp2 = .005. The only significant interaction was between 
Consistency and Level, F(1, 60) = 25.23, p < .001, ηp2 = .296. This demonstrated that for Level 1 there was an 
effect of Consistency, t(15) = 7.08, p < .001, Consistent < Inconsistent, that was not apparent for Level 2, t(15) 
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= 1.13, p = .266. Thus, the pattern of results in the error analyses was consistent with that found in the RT 
analyses. 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Results of Experiment 1. Error bars represent the standard error of the mean.  
 
 
When participants explicitly took the avatar’s perspective, our results demonstrated egocentrism.  
Participants in all conditions were slower when the avatar’s perspective was different from their own and this 
was observed for reaction times and error proportion.  This effect varied in size with level and with blocking, 
but was always significant.  When participants took their own perspective, we saw a different pattern of results 
for level-1 and level-2 perspective-taking (see Figure 4), with the effect most marked when taking into account 
the error proportion.  For level-1 perspective-taking, consistency always affected performance, regardless of 
whether trials were in mixed or separate blocks.  For level-2 perspective-taking, consistency only had a 
significant impact in the mixed block condition.  This suggests that the involuntary computation of the other 
perspective was limited to the level-1 task. 
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EXPERIMENT 2 
Experiment 1 showed that there was a difference between level-1 and level-2 perspective-taking in the degree to 
which other perspective-taking was triggered rapidly and unintentionally.  One thing that differed, however, 
between the two conditions was the number of possible cues to which the participants had to attend, leading to 
the possibility that there was a higher cognitive load in the level-1 than in the level-2 task.  For level-2 
perspective-taking, only the numbers 6 and 9 were used, raising the possibility that participants were able to 
resist interference from the avatar’s perspective because the stimulus set was so small.  For level-1 perspective-
taking, by contrast, the fact that participants had to consider a larger set of stimuli, ranging from 0-3, may have 
led to a greater cognitive load that led to altercentric interference in both blocked and mixed conditions.  To 
investigate this possibility, we repeated the level-2 conditions from Experiment 1, with the additional inclusion 
of stimuli involving 1 and 8, which look the same if viewed from another angle.  This means that the set size for 
level-2 conditions in Experiment 2 was the same as for the level-1 conditions in Experiment 1.  A set-size 
hypothesis would predict that this manipulation should raise the cognitive load, leading to altercentric 
interference in both mixed and blocked conditions; a level-1/ level-2 distinction hypothesis would predict 
findings similar to those in Experiment 1, whereby level-2 perspective-taking is not triggered rapidly or 
unintentionally. 
 
Method 
Participants 
 
Participants were 32 undergraduate students from the University catholique de Louvain, Belgium 
(Mean age: 20.33, 22 female).  All participated in exchange of course credit or a small honorarium.  
 
Design and Procedure 
 Participants were divided into two groups: Mixed and Blocked. The basic procedure matched that of 
the level-2 condition of Experiment 1 (see figure 3).  Participants in the mixed condition completed 192 trials 
(96 Self, 96 Other), on half of trials they judged their own perspective of the identity of a number and on the 
other half they judged the perspective of the avatar.  In the Blocked condition, these self and other trials were 
completed in two separate blocks.  As in Experiment 1, on half of trials self and other perspectives were 
consistent and on the other they were inconsistent.  The crucial point of difference from Experiment 1 was that 
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on this occasion, we included a larger range of stimuli.  As well as being cued with the numbers “six” and 
“nine”, participants were equally likely to be cued with the numbers “one” and “eight”.  Similarly, in addition to 
the four basic picture stimuli (figure 1), an additional set of filler trials were included with the numbers 1 and 8 
displayed in the upright and flat positions.  
 
Results and Discussion 
Self perspective taking (altercentrism) 
Response Times. A 2x2 repeated measures ANOVA with Blocking (Mixed, Blocked) as a between 
subjects factor and Consistency (Consistent, Inconsistent) as a within-subjects factor revealed a main effect of 
Consistency (see figure 5), F(1, 30) = 12.56, p = .001, ηp2 = .296; Consistent < Inconsistent, and an effect of 
Blocking, F(1, 30) = .5.84, p = .022, ηp2 = .163; Blocked < Mixed.  The interaction between Consistency and 
Blocking was also significant, F(1, 30) = 4.434, p = .044, ηp2 = .129.  Follow up t-tests evidenced better 
performance for Consistent (than Inconsistent) trials for the Mixed block condition, t(15) = 3.21, p = .006, but 
not for the Blocked condition, t(15) = 1.52, p = .149. 
Errors. Overall error rate was quite low (6.6%).  There was a main effect of Consistency, F(1, 30) = 
4.86, p = .035, ηp2 = .139; Consistent < Inconsistent, but no effect of Blocking, F(1, 30) = .016, p = .901, ηp2 = 
.001.  The interaction between Consistency and Blocking was not significant, F(1, 30) = 1.75, p = .196, ηp2 = 
.055.  However, the pattern of errors was not suggestive of the RT analyses results being caused by a speed 
accuracy trade-off, since, consistently with the RT results, there was no effect of consistency in the blocked 
condition, t(15) = .676, p = .509 while there was in the mixed condition t(15) = 2.324, p = .035. 
  
Other perspective taking (egocentrism) 
Response Times. A 2x2 repeated measures ANOVA with Blocking (Mixed, Blocked) as a between 
subjects factor and Consistency (Consistent, Inconsistent) as a within-subjects factor revealed a main effect of 
Consistency, F(1, 30) = 62.69, p < .001, ηp2 = .676; Consistent < Inconsistent, but no effect of Blocking, F(1, 
30) = .386, p = .539, ηp2 = .013.  The interaction between Consistency and Blocking was not significant, F(1, 
30) = .803, p = .377, ηp2 = .026. 
Errors. Overall error rates were quite low (6.3%) and were again mainly explored to rule out that the 
RT results reflected a speed-accuracy trade-off.  There was a main effect of Consistency, F(1, 30) = 5.95, p = 
.021, ηp2 = .166; Consistent < Inconsistent, but no effect of Blocking, F(1, 30) = .236, p = .630, ηp2 = .008.  The 
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interaction between Consistency and Blocking was not significant, F(1, 30) = .238, p = .629, ηp2 = .008.  Thus 
the results of the error analyses were consistent with those observed in the RT analyses. 
In summary, increasing set size did not alter the key findings seen in Experiment 1.  For other 
perspective-taking, we again found evidence of egocentrism, it was harder to judge that the avatar saw a 6 if you 
saw a 9, this effect was apparent regardless of whether the trials were presented in separate or mixed blocks.  
For self perspective-taking, we again found evidence of interference from the avatar’s perspective, but again 
only in our mixed block condition.  Experiment 2 favours the level-1/ level-2 hypothesis, that the altercentric 
effect is driven by the type of perspective-taking involved and not by the size of the stimulus set.  
 
 
Figure 5. Results of Experiment 2. Error bars represent the standard error of the mean.  
 
General Discussion 
We deployed direct and indirect measures across two kinds of perspective-taking problem: level-1 
(judging whether someone sees an object) and level-2 (judging how they see it).  Our findings suggest that direct 
and indirect measures tap distinct processes for perspective-taking.  While it was clear that participants 
processed and correctly judged both level-1 and level-2 perspectives when directly asked to do so, the indirect 
measure indicated that only level-1 perspective-taking was triggered outside of cognitive control. 
 
Directly measuring perspective-taking. 
When participants had to judge the perspective of an avatar explicitly (in other-perspective trials), they 
always found this harder if their own perspective was different.  The egocentrism identified fits with previous 
reports that adults show egocentric biases (Nickerson, 1999).  Egocentric biases are consistent with at least two 
perspective-taking strategies.  Firstly, participants could be using a strategy of egocentric anchoring and 
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adjustment (Epley et al, 2004), initially representing a self-perspective and making a series of adjustments away 
from this.  An egocentrism and adjustment hypothesis would suggest that consistent trials are processed more 
easily because self-perspective already represents an appropriate estimate for other-perspective, so effortful 
adjustments are not required.  Another alternative is that participants do immediately begin processing the 
other’s perspective, but suffer interference as their own perspective is a salient distracter. 
Evidence of egocentrism across both level-1 and level-2 perspective-taking still allows that the two 
tasks are achieved by distinct processes.  Explicit judgements of other people’s perspectives may require 
rotation or line of sight calculation (Michelon & Zacks, 2005), may be embodied, or not (Kessler & Thomson, 
2010) and, of course may show a different developmental course (Flavell et al., 1981).  A recent study (Surtees, 
Apperly & Samson, 2013), found that whilst explicit judgements of level-2 visual perspectives were sensitive to 
angular disparity between self and other, explicit judgements of level-1 visual perspectives were not.  Effortful 
perspective-taking affords flexibility of strategy in how we solve perspective-taking problems (Apperly & 
Butterfill, 2009).  This comes at a cost to efficiency and is subject to egocentrism, either from making sufficient 
adjustments to calculate another person’s perspective or through selecting between competing self and other 
perspective contents. 
 
Indirectly measuring perspective-taking 
Not all perspective-taking is undertaken in response to an explicit requirement to judge the content of 
someone else’s perspective.  Evidence from the indirect measure of perspective-taking in the current study 
converges with evidence from Samson et al. (2010) showing that level-1 perspectives may be calculated rapidly 
and unintentionally and extends the evidence base for this effect.  Firstly, the current evidence suggests that 
these effects generalise to avatars that are oriented towards the participant, whereas previous findings have all 
used an avatar whose perspective is perpendicular to the viewer.  Secondly, the current evidence allows direct 
comparison of blocked and mixed block designs and finds equivalent effects in these cases. 
The altercentric interference we observed suggests that the calculation of level-1 perspectives is 
triggered by the presentation of an avatar.  An open question remains as to whether the richness of information 
about perspectives contained when generated in this way is equivalent to that generated through explicit 
processing.  One alternative is that a rich spatial representation has been made of the spatial location of the 
avatar and all objects that form part of his perspective.  Alternatively, the presence of an avatar in a visual scene 
may trigger the generation of two separate sets based on object properties, firstly the set {Objects seen by self} 
 17 
 
and secondly the set {Objects seen by avatar}.  By this second alternative, we may be slower on inconsistent 
trials due to a post-recognition conflict.  To this way of thinking, inconsistent trials are more difficult as 
{Objects seen by self} ≠ {Objects seen by avatar}, rather than because of a qualitative difference between visuo-
spatial representations.  Whilst it may be debated whether this alternative actually means that we have taken the 
avatar’s perspective (e.g., Santiesteban et al., 2014), it is apparent that such a distinction based on object 
properties would be enough to drive recent indirect measures of false belief reasoning (Onishi & Bailergeon, 
2005) and solve many everyday problems (e.g., Heyes, 2014b).  
  We also found evidence of altercentrism in level-2 perspective taking in our mixed block design, 
suggesting that perspective-taking had taken place rapidly in this context, despite the fact that it was irrelevant 
within trials in which participants judged their own perspective.  This finding is consistent with other evidence 
that specific cues and specific conditions can influence the degree to which another’s perspective is processed 
without explicit instructions to do so (Back &Apperly, 2010; German & Cohen, 2012; Surtees, Noordzij & 
Apperly, 2012).  It is also informative that this effect shows that level-2 perspectives can, in principle, be 
calculated with sufficient speed to interfere with a fast judgement of one’s own perspective.  It might have been 
thought that calculating the avatar’s perspective on the numeral stimuli used in the present study was 
intrinsically slow because it required mental rotation (e.g., Carruthers, 2013).  Other research shows that, under 
some circumstances, level-2 perspective taking does indeed require mental rotation (e.g., Surtees et al., 2013), 
but the present findings from mixed blocks of trials show that this can sometimes be performed sufficiently 
quickly to generate altercentric interference for level-2 perspectives.  
In light of the presence of altercentric inference from a level-2 perspective in mixed blocks of trials, the 
absence of this effect when trials were presented in separate blocks is particularly informative.  If interference 
effects on self judgements observed by Samson et al. (2010) were due to rapid and unintentional calculation of 
the avatar’s perspective, then we provide evidence here that under such circumstances this process does not 
calculate level-2 perspectives.  The existence of a process (or set of processes) that is triggered rapidly (Samson 
et al., 2010) and is cognitively efficient (Qureshi et al., 2010) helps to explain how adults meet the perspective-
taking demands everyday social interaction and communication without placing an onerous burden on general 
processing resources.  The fact that unintentional perspective-taking appears limited to level-1 perspectives 
helps explain why more effortful theory of mind processes remain necessary in some cases.  Such limitations 
also cast light on converging evidence from different participant groups on different paradigms, which indicates 
that participants with limited cognitive resources may be able to take level-1 perspectives, but not level-2 
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perspectives.  Tasks using preferential looking or violation of expectation have demonstrated level-1 abilities in 
infancy, but so far there is no evidence of level-2 abilities (Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005, Sodian et al, 2007, 
Southgate et al, 2007).  Children from 2-years of age, but not 18 months, have made explicit solutions requiring 
level-1 perspective-taking (Moll & Tomasello, 2006), but again there is no evidence of such success in a level-2 
paradigm until around the age of four (Flavell et al. 1981).  Of course, the present findings do not preclude the 
existence of alternative efficient processes that calculate level-2 perspectives automatically.  For example, we 
would certainly suppose that specific cases could be automatized through sufficient practice Importantly, our 
findings gain strength from their convergence with other evidence showing related signature limits on efficient 
theory of mind processes across different ages (Low & Watts, 2013; Surtees et al., 2012; Wang et al., 2015), 
cultures (Wang et al., 2015) and experimental paradigms (Low & Watts, 2013).  For this reason, we follow 
Apperly and Butterfill (2009) in suggesting that as a general rule level-2 perspectives, in contrast to level-1 
perspectives, are not calculated outside of cognitive control. 
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